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when we have to do not with domestic precedents but with foreign ones, that is, 
with decisions taken by foreign courts and international judicial institutions, 
particularly when there is no formal obligation for a court to resort to foreign 
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acknowledged to have any (formal) binding force on the case in question? 
How could the practice of following foreign precedents be justified? This 
paper is primarily meant to lay the theoretical basis on which those questions 
can be addressed. The basis on which we proceed in answering those 
questions essentially lies in a theory of legal reasoning that, for lack of a 
better phrase, can be labelled a dialectical approach informed by standards 
of discursive rationality.  
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 INTRODUCTION  I.
 
Precedents matter in law. To be sure, not every legal order attaches the 
same weight and significance to precedent, but none of them treats it 
as entirely insignificant: it stands as a cornerstone of common law 
systems, for example, while enjoying informal recognition in civil law 
systems. Under the doctrine of precedent, decisions taken by courts of 
higher rank in the judicial hierarchy, as well as earlier decisions by the 
same court, must also apply to later cases that fall within the purview 
of the same decision.1 As much as the doctrine of precedent may be 
widely practiced and supported by a presumptively strong set of 
justificatory reasons, it has hardly commanded general acceptance. 
Recourse to precedents in legal adjudication is a source of intriguing 
theoretical challenges and serious practical difficulties. 2  That is 
                                                            
1 Precedents are traditionally said to have vertical effect when they bind lower courts 
and horizontal effect when they bind a court to its own earlier decisions (and the 
doctrine of precedent is correspondingly called vertical in the former case and 
horizontal in the latter). For an introduction to this distinction, see F Schauer, 
Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Cambridge, Mass. 
Harvard University Press 2009), 36-7 and 41-4. 
2 The doctrine of precedent has been a topic of extensive theoretical debate. Among 
the most significant contributions to this debate are A Goodhart, ‘Determining the 
Ratio Decidendi of a Case’ (1930) 40 Yale Law Journal 161; A Goodhart, ‘The Ratio 
Decidendi of a Case’(1959) 22 Modern Law Review 117; R Summers, ‘Two Types of 
Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of Common-Law Justification’ (1978) 63 
Cornell Law Review 707; J Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 
(OUP 1979), 180; N MacCormick, ‘Why Cases Have Rationes and What These Are’ in 
L Goldstein (ed), Precedent in Law (Clarendon Press 1987), 155; M Moore, ‘Precedent, 
Induction, and Ethical Generalization’,  in L Goldstein (ed), Precedent in Law 
( Clarendon Press 1987), 183; S Perry, ‘Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the 
Common Law’ (1987) 7 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 215; F Schauer, ‘Precedent’ 
(1987) 39 Stanford Law Review 571; S Perry, ‘Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty 
and Legal Theory’ (1989) 62 Southern California Law Review 913; L Alexander, 
‘Precedent’ in D Patterson (ed), A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal 
Theory, (Blackwell 1996), ; B Levenbook, ‘The Meaning of a Precedent’ (2000) 6 
Legal Theory 185; G Lamond, ‘Do Precedents Create Rules?’ (2005) 15 Legal Theory 
1; F Schauer, ‘Authority and Authorities’ (2008) 94 Virginia Law Review 1931; and G 
Lamond, ‘Persuasive Authority in the Law’ (2010) XVII The Harvard Review of 
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especially so when we have to do not with domestic precedents but 
with foreign ones, that is, with decisions taken by foreign courts and 
international judicial institutions, particularly when there is no formal 
obligation for a court to resort to foreign law. Can a case decided by 
the judiciary of a different legal order - even if that case is remote and 
that legal order operates under different procedural rules and 
substantive laws - have any bearing on a dispute arising domestically 
here and now? More to the point, should such a foreign precedent be 
acknowledged to have any (formal) binding force on the case in 
question? And how could the practice of following foreign precedents 
be justified? These are but a few of the main questions raised by appeal 
to precedents set in other jurisdictions.  
 
Whereas answering these questions is not just of theoretical 
significance - especially today, issues concerning the use of foreign 
precedents in judicial decision-making are practically relevant, as 
international economic transactions and transnational social 
interactions are multiplying, and with them the potential for legal 
disputes involving actors from different legal orders - this paper is 
primary meant to lay the theoretical basis on which one can make 
sense of the use of foreign precedents in domestic adjudication. More 
specifically, the central question for us will be: What role, if any, 
should foreign precedents have in domestic adjudication?  The basis 
on which we proceed in answering that question fundamentally lies in 
a theory of legal reasoning. We will be arguing, in other words, that in 
order to determine whether and why foreign precedents should be 
relied on, it is essential to have a correct grasp of the nature of 
reasoning in law. This is to say that we proceed from the premise that 
for an insightful account of the practice of recourse to foreign 
precedent in judicial decision-making, we will first need a theory of 
both law and reasoning.  
 
For lack of a better phrase, the theoretical framework we set up in this 
essay will be labelled a dialectical approach informed by standards of 
discursive rationality. We call the approach ‘dialectical’ because it 
conceives of legal reasoning as an exchange of arguments concerning 
what given subjects ought to do in a specific context. The structure of 
legal reasoning will accordingly be understood as shaped by 
discussions between individuals who defend conflicting claims and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Philosophy 16–35.  
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argue against one another. This also means that legal reasoning is an 
essentially context-dependent activity: the specific forms taken by 
sound legal reasoning depend heavily on, and so are largely defined by, 
how actual interactions proceed among those who take part in the 
argumentative exchanges constitutive of legal reasoning in a courtroom, 
typically the judge, the prosecutor, and the parties to a dispute. 3 
Therefore, no adequate account of legal reasoning can be provided 
while neglecting the argumentative moves and strategies of actual 
discussants in a courtroom. But, on the other hand, the context-
dependence is not radical, and so neither is the indeterminacy of the 
processes of reasoning in law. That is because sound legal reasoning 
unfolds in a space whose outlines are broadly framed in advance by a 
set of general rational standards which we call the principles of 
discursive rationality. These rational standards governing legal 
reasoning are so described - as principles of discursive rationality - 
because their content is owed to the necessary presuppositions 
underpinning the communicative interactions between parties in a 
legal proceeding (which parties can for all practical purposes be 
equated with discussants, or participants in a discussion). So, as much 
as legal reasoning may be context-sensitive, its exercise in any specific 
instance and context will still be bound by general standards of reason. 
Hence the label we have chosen for our account as offering a 
dialectical approach to legal reasoning shaped by principles of 
discursive rationality.  
 
This approach issues from two theoretical streams: on the one hand, 
we find the tradition emphasising the dialectical element of reasoning 
in law, on the other hand, there is the tradition conceiving practical 
reasoning as a discursive practice. Our study is, thus, meant to 
combine two existing traditions of legal thoughts that so far have 
                                                            
3 Our stipulation in this essay is that the actors in courtroom proceedings are the 
judge, the prosecutor, and the parties. We are aware that the prosecutor’s role is 
absent from a number of legal systems and types of legal proceeding. In addition, it 
may be that a mediator or arbitrator, replaces the judge in some proceedings. So, 
we ask the reader to bear in mind that our argument may need some adjustment 
when set in the context of legal orders and proceedings where some of the actors we 
mention are absent or are replaced by others. But we are inclined to believe that the 
required adjustments do not entail any revision of the main argument we offer or of 
the central claims we defend. Finally, by way of terminological clarification, by 
‘parties’ we mean not only the actual persons asserting claims against each other in 
a dispute but also their counsel. 
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largely proceeded independently  from one another and yet, we think, 
can be made to work together towards a better understanding of legal 
adjudication. Whilst the theoretical framework we introduce builds on 
views that have already been championed by others, the combination 
of ideas offered here has not been discussed in any systematic way 
before. The originality of the argument is due to the (novel) effort to 
defend a view combining a universalist element - the claim that certain  
general, inescapable principles exist which govern any form of 
reasoning aimed at settling legal disputes - with a context-sensitive and, 
ultimately, particularistic dimension - the conceptual scheme that 
characterises dialectical approaches to practical reasoning. This makes 
our conception at once universalistic and particularistic: Kantian in the 
former sense, Aristotelian in the latter. For, on the one hand, we draw 
on the idea of necessary preconditions of deliberation, qua specific 
form of action, which is an idea central to Kant’s practical philosophy; 
on the other hand, we look to dialectic, which is an idea that finds a 
most comprehensive and sophisticated treatment in Aristotle’s body of 
work. This may give rise to the impression that we are looking at an 
impossible portmanteau theory seeking to bring together two 
irreconcilable stances (the universalistic and the particularistic), which 
are rooted in two traditions (the Kantian and the Aristotelian) 
conventionally regarded as incompatible. 4  However, that is only an 
impression, because the two aspects of the theory (the dialectic one 
and the discursively rational one) are welded by way of a unifying 
element through which we seek to explain legal reasoning as an activity 
based on discussion. This notion of discussion, as properly understood 
and carried out, provides us with a model that functions as both a 
heuristic device and a normative-practical tool enabling different 
parties to work out their controversies by reasoning about the issues in 
question. What this theoretical framework translates to is not an 
algorithm but a conceptual scheme within which to reason in law. So, 
while the framework itself is context-independent (it relies on 
constitutive principles that apply everywhere across the board for any 
kind of argumentative discussion), its use is going to be necessarily 
context-dependent, for there is no discussion that can take place in 
abstracto, independently of the interests, contents, and conceptions 
                                                            
4 The otherwise widespread view that the Kantian tradition and the Aristotelian 
tradition of practical philosophy are incompatible, or even conflicting, has recently 
been challenged in C. Korsgaard, Self-Constitution (Oxford University Press 2009), 14  
in a convincing way. 
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that the parties bring to the table. It is in this way that dialectic, as an 
enabling framework for discussion, can secure the unity and coherence 
of a general theory of legal reasoning, a theory in light of which one 
can explain the nature of recourse to foreign precedent in domestic 
judicial adjudication, while laying out the conditions subject to which 
such recourse can be justified.  
    
The argument we are making is organised as follows. We begin (in 
Section II) by introducing the current debate over the practice of 
relying on foreign precedent in legal adjudication. Then (in Section III) 
we show that the dominant view - which tends to consider that use 
questionable, permitting it only under strict conditions - implies a 
given conception of reasoning in law. We run through the theoretical 
assumptions underlying the dominant view and finally (in Section IV.) 
we introduce an alternative account - a dialectical approach to legal 
issues informed by the idea of discursive rationality. The account will 
be used to support the conclusion that there is nothing either puzzling 
or objectionable about the appeal to foreign precedents in law, 
provided that the foreign precedent a court plans to invoke in its 
decision is discussed and tested for relevance by the prosecutor and 
the parties through the adversarial procedures that frame a legal 
proceeding. The argument so laid out does not amount to a complete 
theory of foreign precedents to be sure, but it does at least offer a 
broad conceptual framework within which such a comprehensive 
theory can be worked out. 
 
 FOREIGN PRECEDENT IN LEGAL ADJUDICATION  II.
 
In several legal systems around the world recourse to foreign case law 
in domestic legal adjudication is both a recurrent occurrence and a 
novel development. 5  For a long time, institutions entrusted with 
                                                            
5 Countless cases are decided by appeal to foreign precedents in different areas of 
law. Worthy of mention among them are, in the United States: New York v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980); Kadic 
v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2nd Cir. 1995); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 
1996); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 721 
(1997); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999); and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003); in South Africa: State v. Makwayanyane, 1995 (3) SALR 391; State v. Zuma, 
1995 (2) SALR 642; Ferreira v. Levin, 1996 (1) SALR 984; Shabalala v. Attorney-General, 
Transvaal, 1996 (1) SALR 725; and State v. Coetzee, 1997 (3) SALR 527; in Canada: 
Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia [1973] S.C.R. 313 and Van der Peet v. The 
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adjudication in colonies have looked to the case law of the relative 
imperial states - and in particular to the case law of those countries’ 
highest courts - especially in deciding disputes not covered by 
domestic statutes and precedents. Over time, this international judicial 
communication has progressively become bidirectional, so much so 
that today the courts in one country will find themselves at the same 
time drawing on the case law of those in another and seeing their own 
case law invoked by courts in countries elsewhere in the world.6 In 
addition, with the establishment of international institutions and 
transnational orders having their own adjudication systems (as in the 
case of the EU and the WTO), national courts have found themselves 
engaging in different ways and to different degrees with the 
jurisprudence (or case law) of the international courts attached to those 
institutions and orders. At the same time, international courts have 
reciprocated, at least occasionally, by taking national legal practices 
and case law into account in their own opinions.7  
 
There is a quite important point that bears mentioning in regard to the 
role those courts play in the development of transnational orders. 
Sometimes a transnational court is created in order for a set of 
principles enshrined in a treaty to have concrete meaning and 
application, and yet no code or statute can be found that will fill up the 
space between the sweeping principled assertion (as in the European 
Convention on Human Rights) and its specific instantiations. What 
follows is a great deal of room for manoeuvre in determining whether 
something is prohibited under those principles. One can appreciate, 
then, how important it becomes, in this sort of situation, to be able to 
rely on a settled use of precedents, as well as on local judicial practice, 
in dealing with the adjudication of rights. And this also shows why it 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Queen [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; in the United Kingdom: Derbyshire County Council v Times 
Newspapers Ltd. [1992] UKHL 6; and, in Italy: Corte di Cassazione, sent. 14488/2004, 
and Corte di Cassazione, sent. 21748/2007.  
6 For a detailed introduction to this evolution in the use of foreign precedents 
around the world, see A Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of Courts’ (2003) 44 
Harvard International Law Journal 191 and G De Vergottini, Oltre il Dialogo tra le 
Corti: Giudici, Diritto Straniero, Comparazione (Il Mulino 2010). See also S Levinson, 
‘Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: Some Reflections’ (2004) 
39 Texas International Law Journal, 353; C G Nucera, 'L'Influence du Precedent 
Étranger sur le Juge National' (2009) 1 Diritto e Impresa/Europa 32. 
7 Paradigmatic in this respect is the relationship that has gradually developed, over 
the course of several judgments, between the European Court of Justice and the 
constitutional courts of EU member states. 
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makes sense for judicial decisions to travel across jurisdictions: 
supranational courts can draw on those local practices in backing up 
their own opinions, thus packaging together a more general and 
cohesive set of rules and principles that national courts can in turn 
invoke as binding. Foreign precedents have thus become the basis for 
a complex multi-directional development in the development of many 
legal systems. 
 
As these preliminary remarks suggest, recourse to foreign 
jurisprudence is not a monolithic practice but rather an internally 
differentiated one. At one extreme we find courts simply pointing out a 
precedent from abroad, and they may even do so in generic terms.8 At 
the other extreme, we find courts genuinely engaging with foreign 
jurisprudence. This engagement may in turn take different forms: it 
may consist in a court drawing on precedents from other legal systems 
without interacting with their judiciary on the merits of the decisions, 
or it may consist in an actual 'dialogue', where courts in different 
countries governed by different legal systems consciously participate in 
what can be regarded as a form of collective deliberation leading to the 
settlement of a legal issue.9  There is authentic cooperation among 
                                                            
8 This practice can be observed, for example, in the decision rendered in the United 
States in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).  
9 This was the practice followed in the South African cases Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 
1996 (3) SALR 850; State v. Solberg, 1997 (4) SALR 1176; Premier, Kwazulu-Natal v. 
President of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (1) SALR; Bernstein v. Bester, 1996 (2) 
SALR 751; and Minister of Finances v. Van Heerden, 2004 (11) BCLR 1125, to name but a 
few. The 'dialogue' metaphor is a metaphor widely used today in legal doctrine in 
order to give a unitary account to the many different ways in which courts ultimately 
resort to foreign legal contents. In keeping pace with a widespread doctrinal 
tradition (that is well summarised in G De Vergottini, Oltre il Dialogo tra Corti: 
Giudici, Diritto Straniero, Comparazione, (Il Mulino 2010), for instance),we use the 
metaphor to refer only to the situation in which different courts belonging to 
formally distinct legal systems mutually refer to the precedents established by other 
courts in a consistent way, by so contributing to set up a procedure of ‘informal 
collective’ adjudication, so to speak, even in the absence of any formal obligation. 
An example of a dialogue between courts (as it is understood in this contribution) is 
the so-called 'multi-level' protection of human rights in the European space that 
has been provided by the (informal) coordinated effort of the Court of Justice of 
Luxembourg and the European Court of Human Rights of Strasbourg. Whilst those 
courts formally belong to different systems, they have embarked into a process of 
mutual coordination through the practice of cross-citation, which practice has in 
turn contributed to generating a convergent vision of human rights (on this process 
see S Douglas Scott, 'A Tales of Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the 
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courts in this scenario, in that they operate in different legal systems 
and so are not bound by any formal hierarchical relationship. Forms of 
mutual recognition  and even cross-citation (the previously mentioned 
practice where courts in one legal system resort to precedents set in a 
different system, and at the same time see their own precedents 
invoked by courts in that other system) may thus emerge.  
 
The practice of relying on foreign precedents, therefore, reveals itself 
to be a variegated and multifaceted phenomenon. Yet, for all this 
diversity, the practice can also be observed to share at least two 
elements common to all its forms. In the first place, in order for courts 
in different legal systems to be able to interact - whatever form such 
interaction may take (mere citation, one-way engagement, or genuine 
'dialogue') - the different systems must share some fundamental legal 
traditions and general principles of law. Courts, in other words, tend to 
look to the jurisprudence of legal systems that share with their own 
systems more than just a few marginal features. In the second place, 
unless a court is hierarchically subordinate to the one whose precedent 
it appeals to, the force of that precedent is most likely not going to be 
binding, but at most persuasive. In fact, recourse to foreign precedents 
is generally regarded as legitimate but not mandatory: while a court 
may well invoke precedents set in foreign systems, it is under no 
obligation to do so, and these precedents will not carry the force of law 
in the domestic system (a domestic court may disregard them if it finds 
that they do not capture any superior wisdom). 
 
In this practice of transnational judicial communication, much of the 
attention usually goes to the supreme courts and constitutional courts 
of certain countries, as well as to certain international courts, whose 
jurisprudence has accordingly come to form what appears to be a 
global judicial repository. This repository is widely consulted, and 
recourse to it often appears decisive in determining the outcome of a 
case, even though the domestic courts that draw on that case law 
belong to legal systems that on the whole may be markedly different 
from the one where the precedent was set.   
 
There seems to be little to object to, at least on an intuitive level, in the 
rationale behind the practice where precedents circulate across the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Growing European Human Rights Acquis', (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 
629).  
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world: it makes sense, when facing a hard case, to try and learn from 
comparable legal cases, and from the arguments deployed by other 
trained professionals in dealing with them, whenever and wherever 
these are available. The same ideal of cognitive and decision-making 
efficiency that justifies recourse to domestic precedent can be 
extended to the use of foreign precedents too. Apparently, if this 
justification for recourse to foreign precedents is to stand, the practice 
of turning to them cannot be perfunctory (mere citation), but must be 
fully engaged (ie it must be accompanied by thorough analysis), 
precisely because such precedents are not formally binding, which 
makes it all the more important to lay out the reasons that make them 
pertinent and compelling.  
 
Still, as much as recourse to foreign precedent in domestic 
adjudication may be a time-honoured, widespread, and prima facie 
justified practice, it continues to spark a great deal of debate and 
controversy. On the one hand, we will find praise for a court’s reliance 
on foreign precedents even without any formal obligation to do so.10 
On this view, the practice concretises a valuable idea of judicial 
transnational cooperation that facilitates the circulation and sharing of 
legal wisdom. There is nothing objectionable about the use of foreign 
precedents, especially if the aim is not to mechanically import a 
specific rule from abroad, but to arrive at a better understanding of the 
case in question. In other words, it is hardly surprising that the same 
set of facts should find a consistent legal interpretation across judicial 
boundaries on the part of judges whose legal background and training 
is roughly similar, and it is not improbable (in light of those premises) 
for their legal analyses to be mutually illuminating. So, when it comes 
                                                            
10 Recourse to foreign precedents in legal adjudication has been defended by D 
Beatty, ‘Constitutional Rights in Japan and Canada’ (1993) 41 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 535; D Beatty, ‘Law and Politics’ (1996) 44  American Journal of 
Comparative Law 131; C Steiker, ‘Pretoria, Not Peoria: FCIS S v. Makwayanyane 1995 
(3) SALR 391’ (1996) 74 Texas Law Review 1285; and S Levinson, ‘Looking Abroad 
When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: Some Reflections’ (2004) 39 Texas 
International Law Journal 353, and  J Waldron, 'Foreign Law and the Modern Jus 
Gentium' (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review 129, among others. The practice has also 
been defended by judges both in the United States - with Calabresi (see, eg United 
States v. Then, 56 F3.d 464 (2nd Cir. 1995), at 469), S Day O’Connor, ‘Broadening 
Our Horizons: Why American Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law’ (1998) 45 
Federal Lawyer 20 and S Breyer, ‘Keynote Address’ (2003) 97 American Society of 
International Law Proceedings 265, 266 - and in Canada, with L’Heureux-Dube (see, 
eg The Queen v. Elshaw [1991] 3 S.C.R. 24). 
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to finding a basis on which to rest a solid legal qualification of a given 
dispute, a previous decision can prove valuable even if it comes from a 
foreign court. At the same time, recourse to foreign jurisprudence may 
prove to be a wholesome exercise in modesty: it is not indiscriminate 
that judges will look abroad in deciding a case, nor is the point to make 
a display of judicial acumen and learning. Quite the contrary, what 
prompts such recourse is a realisation that domestic law may be 
inadequate to the task - silent, unclear, vague, indeterminate, even 
contradictory in relation to the facts in question - or that the judge 
personally lacks the skills and intellectual resources needed to decide 
the case in a satisfactory way. In view of these limitations, which are 
both objective and subjective, it seems quite reasonable to engage with 
the way that other judges in other legal systems have decided a given 
question, especially when those systems are rooted in legal traditions 
comparable to one’s own and rest on compatible fundamental legal 
principles. 
 
On the other hand, there are legal practitioners and theorists who 
stand firmly opposed to the practice of resorting to foreign 
jurisprudence.11 A legal system, they claim, is the product of unique 
institutional histories, specific legal traditions, political arrangements 
not amenable to generalisation, and locally coloured social relations. 
Legal norms and institutions emerge from historical, cultural, and 
social ties that shape a people’s national identity under a given 
jurisdiction. Since even superficial similarities between legal traditions 
and disciplines are bound to dissolve on closer scrutiny, any cross-
cultural intervention aimed at assimilating legal categories, traditions, 
institutions, and provisions to one another will ultimately show itself to 
be ungrounded and arbitrary. So, far from being a case of benign legal 
cross-fertilisation, the use of foreign precedents in judicial decision-
making should be understood as a form of legal ‘transplantation’. Like 
                                                            
11 Among the number of those opposing the practice one may include R Alford, ‘On 
the Limits of “Grand Theory” in Comparative Law’ (1986) 61 Washington Law 
Review 945; R Alford, ‘Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution’ 
(2004) 98 Agora 57; and E Young, ‘Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem’ 
(2005) 119 Harvard Law Review 148. Practitioners who criticise the use of foreign 
precedents in domestic adjudication are Justice Scalia (cf. Thomson v. Oklahoma, 487 
U.S. 815, at 868-9, for instance; see also his ‘Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal 
Courts’ (2004) 98 American Society of International Law Proceedings 305) in the US 
and Justice LaForest (cf. The Queen v. Rahey [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, just to make one 
example) in Canada. 
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any attempt to export something uniquely bound up with a given 
domain so as to transplant it into a different domain, judicial reliance 
on foreign precedents involves a great degree of discretion, thus 
lending itself to the creation of atypical constructs. In this sense it 
proves to be a largely uncontrollable activity. For this reason, the 
practice in question should be considered inherently subjective and 
fundamentally unjustified.  
 
In sum, recourse to foreign precedent in legal adjudication is at once 
widespread (courts in many legal systems we are familiar with routinely 
engage in this practice) and controversial, in that legal practitioners, 
commentators, and theorists are deeply divided over the question 
whether the practice is legitimate, reasonable, or even expedient. In 
what follows, then, we offer a closer discussion of the theoretical 
assumptions involved in the practice. This will make it possible to 
bring the practice under critical scrutiny and may help us not only to 
understand what is at stake in the debate, but also to bring in our own 
alternative proposal, which lends qualified support to the practice.  
 
 THE DOMINANT VIEW III.
 
Currently most legal practitioners and scholars in the Western world 
believe that foreign precedents should be distinguished and treated 
differently from domestic precedents. On this view, domestic 
precedents are formally binding (at least in common law systems): 
every court is bound to follow the precedents set by any higher-ranked 
or equally ranked court that has already decided a case of the same 
kind. 12  A foreign precedent, by contrast, is said to have merely 
persuasive force. There is no obligation to follow it, or at least it having 
been set in the past is not in itself ground on which to make it binding. 
                                                            
12 The formal binding force of domestic precedents is not absolute, or exceptionless. 
Lower courts are on occasion allowed to depart from a precedent by distinguishing it, 
that is, single out features of an earlier case in such a way as to attenuate its 
precedential effect, thus making it irrelevant to the case at hand. Similarly, later 
courts are allowed to overrule previous decisions that can be argued to be extremely 
wrong or to have serious implications. Apart from those exceptions, however, 
domestic precedents are, to put it in the legal vernacular, sources of law. For an 
introduction to the standard doctrine of domestic precedents, see L Alexander, 
‘Precedent’ in D Patterson (ed), A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal 
Theory (Blackwell 1996), 503; G Lamond, ‘Precedent’ (2007) 5 Philosophy Compass 
699; and F Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning (. 
Harvard UP 2009), 36. 
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Related, the impact of a foreign precedent on future cases depends 
exclusively on its soundness, as evidenced by its ability to convince 
courts in a different legal system that it has been decided correctly as a 
past case identical to the present one in all relevant respects. 
 
The view just introduced assumes a rigid dichotomy in dealing with 
precedents, or a clear demarcation between domestic and foreign 
precedent, which in law are claimed to operate differently. This dualist 
approach we will henceforth refer to as the ‘dominant view’, since it 
not only underpins a significant amount of academic studies of 
precedent-based adjudication, but is also adhered to by most 
practitioners, especially judges. 13  Crucially, the dominant view’s 
distinction between types of precedents is instrumental to justifying 
the claim that courts should be wary of relying on foreign precedents 
in settling domestic disputes. There are at least two main reasons why 
those embracing the dominant view regard the appeal to foreign 
precedents as problematic (at least presumptively).  
 
The first of these is that the practice turns into domestic law what is 
essentially foreign law: it does so almost by definition, since the 
practice consists precisely in bringing a domestic case under the rule 
of a foreign precedent, which in a strict sense cannot be regarded as 
part of the legal system within which the dispute arose. This raises a 
problem because non-domestic law, on the dominant view, does not 
qualify as law to begin with (not from the domestic point of view): it 
must (from that point of view) be treated as extra-legal material, in the 
literal sense that it lies outside the boundaries of what a domestic 
system can recognise as its own law. It follows that to resort to foreign 
precedent is ultimately to blur the distinction between what is legal 
and what is extra-legal: it amounts to indirectly justifying the practice 
of adjudicating cases - that is, determining what the law says in regard 
to those cases - in light of non-legal material, inclusive of social norms, 
moral standards, and policy considerations, among other things.14 This 
                                                            
13 Among the advocates of the dominant view one may include G Fletcher, ‘The 
Universal and the Particular in Legal Discourse’ (1987) 2 BYU Law Review 335; G 
Fletcher, ‘Constitutional Identity’ (1993) 14 Cardozo Law Review 737; F Schauer, 
‘Free Speech and the Cultural Contingency of Constitutional Categories’ (1993) 14 
Cardozo Law Review 865; R. Posner and C. Sunstein, ‘The Law of Other States’ 
(2006) 59 Stanford Law Review 131; and F. Schauer, ‘Authority and Authorities’ 
(2008) 94 Virginia Law Review 1931. 
14 Accordingly, G Smorto, 'L'Uso Giurisprudenziale della Comparazione' (2010) 1 
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cannot but strike us as contradictory if we follow that logic closely. So, 
the argument here is that by introducing into one country the law in 
force in another country - governed by another set of rules and 
institutions set in a different political context - the use of foreign 
precedent in judicial decision-making winds up making judicial 
reasoning ultimately indistinguishable from practical reasoning at large. 
That, on the dominant view, is an illegitimate intrusion of external 
influences in a sphere, the legal domain, which should maintain an 
identity of its own. 
 
The second problem the dominant view has with recourse to foreign 
precedent lies in the discretionary vacuum within which the practice 
ordinarily takes place. Indeed, in most cases there is no express 
obligation to have recourse to foreign precedents, nor is there any set 
of principles on which basis to (a) determine whether to have such 
recourse and, if so, (b) select the proper precedent. The problem here 
is not so much the use of foreign precedents per se as the ability to 
make any decision in that regard on whatever basis seems reasonable 
enough, without reference to any agreed framework for making such 
choices. In exercising this ability to ‘shop around’ in search of the best 
foreign precedent, courts essentially gain the power to choose the 
grounds on which a case is to be decided. This is too much discretion - 
far greater than one should accept as part of the regular process, or 
‘physiology’, of legal adjudication, for it becomes a breeding ground 
for creative judicial decision-making.  Since there is no rule mandating 
appeal to foreign precedents in legal adjudication (the practice is 
permissible but not obligatory), nor is there any rule under which to 
determine which precedents ought to govern in any given case, 
different courts are going to use that discretionary power in different 
ways in deciding cases brought before them. The consequence of this 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Europa e Diritto Privato 223, and G De Vergottini, Oltre il Dialogo tra Corti: Giudici, 
Diritto Straniero, Comparazione (Il Mulino 2010) 140, distinguish at least three 
different uses of foreign precedents in judicial adjudication: a) a purely 'ornamental' 
use of precedents, that takes place when the justification can be considered sound 
and complete even without the quotation of the relevant foreign precedent (which, 
therefore, from a logical point of view adds nothing to the decision); b) a 'normative' 
use of precedents, wherein the decision of the present case is the direct application, 
or emanation, of the rule embodied in some foreign decision; c) a 'dialectical' use of 
foreign precedents, which occurs when the court refers to the factual 
reconstructions made in the justification of the foreign precedent in order to get a 
better understanding of the domestic case at stake. 
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state of affairs is that controversies of the same type may wind up being 
decided on different legal grounds within the same legal system. As a 
result, we end up with a scenario of reduced control of legal 
adjudication, making for a less certain process given to greater 
unpredictability of outcomes.  
 
Even when the critical arguments just outlined do not altogether 
disqualify the practice of resorting to foreign precedent, they do 
suggest caution: they point up the need to introduce strict criteria 
governing and limiting the use of foreign precedents so as to make that 
use legitimate. On the dominant view, three such criteria are typically 
held up. First, recourse to foreign precedent is legitimate only when 
the body of domestic law is inconclusive, particularly when interpreted 
literally or in accordance with the legislator’s original intention. This 
means that appeal to foreign precedent is legitimate, if its use serves 
the purpose of filling gaps in domestic law: it is not legitimate as a way 
to overturn or bypass a holding issued on the basis of domestic law 
(that is, as a technique of judicial activism).15 Second, courts may not 
proceed ad hoc in making decisions about the relevance of foreign 
precedents to domestic cases: they must proceed in a consistent 
manner, in keeping with a doctrine of foreign precedent having a 
degree of generality and comprehensiveness comparable to that which 
characterises doctrine of domestic precedent.16 Third, if a court does 
decide to resort to foreign precedent as a basis on which to settle a 
domestic case, it cannot borrow from any legal system of its own 
choosing: the precedent appealed to ought to be one set in a legal 
system whose institutional framework and fundamental legal principles 
are similar to, or at least consistent with, the domestic legal system in 
which the case is being heard. The rationale for this requirement is 
that a precedent does not exist in isolation from the legal system it is 
part of. So, a precedent at least indirectly bears the mark of the 
institutional framework it is derived from. This in turn means that 
through the practice of deciding a domestic dispute on the basis of 
legal materials originating in a foreign system, we not only inject a 
specific rule of foreign law into the domestic system but also, more 
                                                            
15 This is a view defended in M Lupoi, Sistemi Giuridici Comparati (EDS 2001) and G 
Smorto, ‘L’Uso Giurisprudenziale della Comparazione’ (2010) 1 Europa e diritto 
privato 223, among many others.  
16 This view is defended in M Ramsey, ‘International Materials and Domestic Rights: 
Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence’ (2004) 98 Agora 69, for instance. 
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problematically, we bring in a whole set of accompanying institutional 
arrangements, general principles, and justificatory arguments. 
Accordingly, the more alien the foreign system, the greater the 
likelihood that the importation of foreign precedent will give rise to 
normative inconsistencies, local ones, but also conceivably deeper ones, 
precisely because to import a single rule or precedent is to import its 
underlying or system-wide rationale. Hence the need for courts to limit 
the reservoir of foreign law from which to draw by selecting only those 
precedents whose enveloping legal system is similar to the domestic 
one not just on the surface or in a broad sense, but on a foundational 
level too. 
  
Now, in order for one to get a full sense of this set of restrictions on a 
court’s reliance on foreign precedent, one has to dig deeper and 
consider the theoretical assumptions underpinning the dominant view. 
We submit that the dominant view of foreign precedents needs to be 
viewed in light of a broader conception of the legal system and of the 
reasoning and authority associated with it.17 On this conception, which 
one may want to categorise as sociologically oriented and broadly 
positivistic, the law is understood primarily as a set of issuances 
coming from the political institutions linked to a given domestic 
jurisdiction. Law is the ‘will’ of a political institution: it is the 
expression of a sovereign power through which a rule becomes legally 
valid and socially effective. From the standpoint of one who is 
committed to these claims, the problem with the use of foreign 
precedents is that foreign precedents are not issued by the political 
institutions empowered to make (the rest of) the law in a given 
jurisdiction.18 When courts appeal to foreign precedents in deciding 
disputes, they are not relying exclusively on the law created by, or 
traceable to, the institutions entrusted with law-making in their own 
legal order. Accordingly, from the standpoint of one who conceives of 
the law as the product of the political institutions endowed with 
                                                            
17 We should add here that this broad conception is not always made explicit by 
those who urge caution in appealing to foreign precedents in legal adjudication. 
Therefore, the reader should be aware of the fact that in these pages we are in fact 
reconstructing and reinterpreting the theoretical assumptions underpinning the 
dominant view, as opposed to describing those assumptions as they have expressly 
been set out by the advocates of the dominant view.  
18 This point is made most clearly by a critic of the dominant view, J Waldron, in his 
‘Foreign Law and the Modern Jus Gentium’ (2005) 119 Harvard Law Review 129-47, 
146-7. 
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authority in a given jurisdiction, the practice of appealing to foreign 
precedents in adjudication finds no straightforward justification, since 
it can be argued that the practice itself eventually resorts to an 
unwarranted use of extra-legal material in adjudication.19 The point can 
be restated from a different angle by noticing that what on the 
dominant view makes the recourse to foreign precedent objectionable 
is that the practice ultimately severs legal adjudication from the law. 
However, this amounts to making legal adjudication an activity whose 
nature is at least partly non-legal. Moreover, one can see the 
contradiction this statement seems to give rise to: how can we 
legitimately call ‘legal’ a form of adjudication that largely proceeds 
independently of the law?  
 
These remarks show that the dominant view is grounded in the 
conception of a legal system as a closed and self-contained space: a 
geographically delimited domain that can be kept distinct from the 
outside world. A legal system, in other words, singles out a territorial 
entity only moderately and partly permeable to external influences: 
each legal system is largely independent of the other systems of laws, 
understood as demarcating altogether different institutional spheres. 
Overlaps between different systems of law must therefore be kept to a 
minimum, for otherwise it would no longer be possible for those 
systems to retain the separation that on the dominant view 
constitutively defines the identity of law.20 What is problematic about 
recourse to foreign precedent in legal adjudication, then, is its blurring 
of the boundaries of a legal system, which accordingly wears away at its 
identity and independence. By importing foreign decisions and modes 
of reasoning into the domestic system, recourse to foreign precedent 
makes permeable the wall of separation between what is inside the 
system (law) and what is outside (non-law). For this reason the recourse 
                                                            
19 Indeed, on the sociologically oriented and positivist conception, anything not 
traceable to domestic law-making institutions must be regarded as non-legal 
material or, stated otherwise, nothing that is not created by such domestic 
institutions can be counted as law. 
20 As a matter of fact, some regard the distinction between in and out - what is inside 
a legal system and what falls outside - as a defining element not only of a legal system 
but also of the very idea of law. The radical variant of this claim amounts to the so-
called ‘limited domain thesis’, which is a fundamental tenet of legal positivism (cf. J 
Raz, ‘Postema on Law’s Autonomy and Public Practical Reasons: A Critical 
Comment’ (1998) 4 Legal Theory 1–20, for instance) and has found a recent 
revisionary statement in F Schauer, ‘The Limited Domain of the Law’ (2004) 90 
Virginia Law Review 1909. 
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to foreign precedents can be legitimised only if exceptional and 
subjected to a rigorous internal discipline.  
 
This broad conception of the legal system is in turn inextricably bound 
up with a specific model of legal authority: the model that depicts legal 
authority as an institutional arrangement whose directives are to be 
obeyed not on the merits, but simply because they issue from those 
arrangements. One can see that this conception of legal authority 
cannot easily be made to cohere with the practice of recourse to 
foreign precedent, for the force associated with foreign precedents is 
not procedural or formal, but rather persuasive. Legal adjudication 
based on foreign precedents is thus primarily a matter of reasoning 
one’s way through disputes and controversies, as opposed to following 
directives that are formally valid and binding just because they come 
from certain bodies. Whenever courts appeal to a foreign precedent, 
they resort to a substantive argument aimed at convincing the parties, 
as well as the legal community at large, that the settlement of a given 
dispute is convincing by virtue of its content.  To the extent that 
foreign directives are content-based - or to the extent that they rely on 
content-dependent reasons that take precedence over formal, content-
independent reasons - their introduction into the domestic system is 
liable to undermine its authority (in the formal sense being explained), 
a circumstance that seems intuitively puzzling, considering that law 
ought to be a paradigmatic instance of an authoritative institution. 
 
 AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE  IV.
 
Thus far we have noted that, on the dominant view, foreign precedents 
do not have equal standing with domestic precedents: whereas 
domestic precedents are formally binding and their use is mandatory, 
foreign precedents have conditional persuasive force and their use is 
merely permissible. The dominant view can in this sense be said to 
offer a radical two-tiered account of precedent in law, where one type 
of precedent (the domestic) is recognised as a binding source of law, 
while the other type (the foreign) at best rises to the rank of a source 
that may, but need not, be relied on in legal adjudication. We submit 
that this dualism informing the whole dominant view is problematic, 
for it can encourage practices that have us distinguish law from non-
law in an arbitrary and rigid way, making for a sort of conceptual 
schizophrenia in handling the two. In this section we intend to offer an 
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alternative approach to the practice of appealing to foreign precedent. 
In so doing, we also lay the basis for an integrated account of 
precedents that significantly reduces the gap the dominant view sees 
between domestic and foreign precedents. This will make it possible to 
subject the two types of precedent to different conditions of use, while 
giving them an equal status as authoritative sources of law, sources that 
courts are not only entitled but also expected to appeal to in 
adjudication. 
 
We will argue for our alternative conception by first introducing its 
fundamental theoretical presuppositions and then proceeding to bring 
those presuppositions to bear on the specific debate on the use of 
foreign precedents in law.21 The two treatments are meant to work in 
combination: the theoretical presuppositions are introduced as part of 
a discussion of their role in the claims made about foreign precedents, 
for in this way we can provide the foundations on which to rest a 
conception that, if coherently developed by bringing out its 
implications, can become general enough as a framework within which 
to address the full range of essential questions traditionally discussed 
in connection with the practice of resorting to foreign precedents in 
legal adjudication. 
 
The nature of the conception we introduce is primarily normative, and 
the ensuing discussion of foreign precedent should also be understood 
that way . As much as we may start out from current legal practice in 
our investigation of recourse to foreign precedent in legal adjudication, 
our primary concern is not to explain these practices (such as they 
exist), but to understand how reasoning with foreign precedent in law 
ought to proceed in order for it to be justified. In a nutshell, then, in 
what follows we lay out a normative and theoretical account that both 
idealises and abstracts from actual adjudication practices based on the 
use of foreign precedents. This means that the account we present will 
be designed to provide a basis on which to distinguish justified 
recourse to foreign precedent from a recourse that is not justified. We 
will do so in particular by offering a theory of sound reasoning with 
foreign precedent in law, namely, a theory pointing out a mode of 
                                                            
21 We have chosen to so organise our exposition, in that order, because we believe 
that only by making the theoretical assumptions underpinning our view explicit will 
it be possible to work out a truly alternative way to approach foreign precedent in 
law. 
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argumentation that courts should use vis-à-vis foreign precedents. 
 
 Dialectical Model for Legal Reasoning 1.
 
As was just remarked, our project consists in contributing to a theory 
of legal reasoning setting out the conditions subject to which the 
citation of foreign precedents can be justified. The natural place from 
which to start is a discussion about the nature of reasoning in legal 
adjudication. To anticipate the basics of our proposal, it is our view 
that legal reasoning in the courtroom should properly be considered a 
dialectical exercise: an argumentative exchange between the prosecutor 
and the parties in a courtroom.22 Our hypothesis, therefore, is that 
what determines the soundness of legal reasoning is a discussion-based, 
or dialectical, ideal. This ideal is in turn defined and partly determined 
by the principles of discursive rationality, that is, by the standards of 
reason on which any debate in the practical domain rests, and absent 
which there could be no exchange of views involving a decision on a 
matter of common interest. So, legal reasoning will be understood here 
as a dialectical activity geared towards solving legal disputes amenable 
to a discursive solution. This concise statement of our position 
requires some further elaboration and argument.  
 
We begin with the understanding that legal reasoning - by which 
phrase, unless otherwise specified, in this essay we mean the activity of 
                                                            
22 From here on out, and unless stated otherwise, the term legal reasoning will be 
used to refer to the whole of the deliberative activities that take place in courtroom 
proceedings. We do realise that in common parlance “legal reasoning” has a much 
broader meaning and it is not confined to deliberative activities engaged in by 
judges, prosecutors, and the parties in a courtroom setting - for forms of legal 
reasoning are also undertaken outside the courtroom by academics, laypeople, and 
the media. We also agree that for many purposes a broad conception of “legal 
reasoning” - a conception under which legal reasoning is understood as any 
deliberative activity that is concerned with legal standards and is carried out by any 
subject (be it a legal scholar, a public official, a practitioner or a layperson) - is fully 
justified and acceptable. We make use of a  narrower conception - the conception 
that “legal reasoning” stands for the activity of reasoning, argument and deliberating 
in a courtroom - in this essay in order to delimit the concern of our argument by 
thus making it both clearer and more manageable. We would like to think, even if 
we are unable to show this here, that the account of legal reasoning we present can 
itself be expanded so as to cover that broader range. Anyway, the reader should be 
aware that our decision to reserve the phrase “legal reasoning” to a specific subset 
of deliberative activities is understood as a purely terminological stipulation bearing 
no substantive, or theoretical, implication. 
2014]  Foreign Precedents in Judicial Argument               160 
reasoning, arguing, and deliberating in a courtroom - paradigmatically 
consists in, and can be reconstructed as, a series of communicative 
exchanges between parties arguing for competing normative theses and 
providing evidence for alternative reconstructions of the facts. The 
structure of these exchanges is adversarial, in that they are conducted 
under a procedure designed to give all parties a fair shot at laying out 
their arguments and counterarguments: the claims made by one party 
(the proponent) are challenged by the other party (the challenger); the 
proponent will then rebut by looking for flaws in the challenge or 
seeking to take it down altogether, at which point the challenger will 
be expected to defend the challenge so criticised, and so on. In this 
adversarial procedure lies the basic structure of reasoning in 
courtroom proceedings. The structure of legal reasoning can thus be 
described at its barest as an adversarial succession of speech acts 
performed in a courtroom by parties who for all practical purposes can 
be equated with discussants. This is the basis on which we claim that 
legal reasoning ought to be conceived as dialectical. 
 
The dialectical exchanges constitute, and at the same time are made 
possible by, the adversarial procedures by which argumentative activity 
in the courtroom is structured. Their relevance for the construction of 
a rational decision cannot be overstressed. An adversarial procedure 
sets one party against another, both of whom are guaranteed equal 
rights and duties. Starting from this position of formal equality, the 
parties in an adversarially structured courtroom proceeding will be 
attempting to convince each other that the claims they made are 
grounded and so should be accepted by everyone. At the same time, 
the opponent’s view would be shown to be unacceptable or even 
absurd or inconsistent. On this view, adversarialism not only captures 
the core of reasoning in law, but also provides the source of its 
justification. This is because adversarial procedures are not simply 
structural methods enabling parties to settle a dispute in an orderly 
fashion, but, more importantly, they are to be understood as 
intrinsically valuable from an epistemic point of view: they can be 
shown to be the most reliable strategy we have to achieve the regulative 
ideals of normative correctness. In view of the constitutive partiality 
and inherent situatedness of any single perspective, the search for 
normative correctness eludes the efforts of particular individuals. The 
prosecutor and the parties, considered in isolation from each other, 
can hardly aspire to move beyond their own qualified notions of 
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correctness, which is intrinsically one-sided and thus ultimately 
incomplete. This means that the discursive exchanges shaped by 
adversarial procedures are equipped to connect otherwise partial 
viewpoints, while putting them to the test to see if they stand up to 
scrutiny. By enabling prosecutor and parties to state and defend their 
claims, while giving them an opportunity to challenge the position held 
by the counterparty, courtroom debates based on adversarial 
procedures and mutual confutation take us a step closer to what is 
normatively correct in the practical domain. 23  The conception just 
outlined frames legal reasoning as a collective deliberative exercise. In 
this framework, the prosecutor, the parties, and the judge each play a 
fundamental role in shaping the structure and outcome of reasoning in 
legal adjudication. Legal reasoning is thus a three-party affair.24 On the 
one hand, one can hardly overemphasise the essential role played by 
the prosecutor and the parties in the activity of reasoning in law. The 
prosecutor and the parties put forward arguments and set out to 
counter each other’s claims. They do so by asking questions, replying 
to queries, offering narratives, interpreting norms, and collecting 
evidence, among other activities. On the other hand, one should not 
underrate the role of judges, in shaping reasoning in the courtroom, 
since they are entrusted with the essential task of supervising the 
discursive exchanges between the prosecutor and the parties. Indeed, 
at a minimum the judge will be acting as a referee, overseeing the 
communication between courtroom discussants. Even though this may 
be reconstructed as a passive, spectator-like role, the fact that the judge 
is presiding as an expert spectator, entrusted with making sure that the 
parties are proceeding in the right way in challenging each other’s 
claims should not be downplayed. This, in turn, brings into focus the 
judge’s structural role in the proceedings: the judge is primarily there 
to structure and organise the exchange between the parties, correct any 
                                                            
23  On this view, normative correctness is secured by, and anchored to, the 
adversarial structure of legal deliberation in court. In other words, normative 
correctness is not defined by, and grounded in, some pre-established authority. The 
justification and binding force of normative conclusions transcend the boundaries 
of the specific controversy; there is no external social fact or practice that can 
ground the correctness of the normative conclusions drawn in legal adjudication. 
This position is argued at length in F Cavalla, La Prospettiva Processuale del Diritto 
(CEDAM 1991), 36-45 and F. Cavalla, Retorica Processo Verità (Franco Angeli 2007). 
For a philosophical foundation of this position, see O O’Neill, Constructions of 
Reason (CUP 1989), 28.  
24 In De iudiciis, Bulgarus accordingly describes legal reasoning as an actus trium 
personarum. 
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substantive disparity hidden behind the formal equality, weigh in with 
legal expertise and experience, and see to it that the overall adversarial 
procedure does not depart from its dialectical logic. So, central to 
reasoning in law, on a dialectical approach, is the critical exchange, or 
debate, in which narratives and normative interpretations are put 
forward as valid and are subjected to scrutiny, where they are 
challenged, a process in which they may be falsified or shown to be 
untenable. We can see, thus, that the discussion carried out in a 
courtroom proceeding can hardly be resolved into a two-party 
confrontation: it is an adversarial engagement that unfolds under the 
watchful eye of a third party, the judge, acting as a ‘guardian’ of the 
fundamental principles by which debate, qua dialectical exchange, is 
governed in the courtroom, or by which reasoning is constitutively and 
essentially shaped in legal adjudication.  
 
In sum, reasoning in law, on a dialectical approach, is paradigmatically 
an activity aimed at settling a dispute under the oversight of a judge 
mediating the exchange that unfolds in a courtroom between prosecutor 
and parties. The outcome of a legal controversy thus emerges gradually 
and requires the participation and interchange of prosecutor, parties, 
and judge. No outcome can be regarded as correct - that is, acceptable 
by any rational discussant - unless the reasons proffered by the 
prosecutor and the parties in legal deliberation are heard and 
scrutinised, a process through which they will either be found to carry 
weight in a judicial decision or will be shown to be untenable.25 
 
Now, discussants engaged in discursive interaction or deliberative 
activity may well disagree on how the legal disputes at hand ought to 
be settled (and in fact disagreement is typically the norm). However, 
their participation in adversarial procedures aimed at dealing with 
those disagreements at least implicitly commits them to certain 
standards of practical rationality. These are the standards that state the 
conditions for the very possibility of dialectical interaction among 
individuals having different interests and objectives. For absent a set of 
rational criteria, which by virtue of their being constitutive of 
adversarial, or dialectical, exchanges also regulate those exchanges 
from within and so amount to inherently normative standards, there 
can be no dialectical process; meaning that there can be no discourse 
                                                            
25  An insightful discussion of these questions can be found in P Sommaggio, 
Contraddittorio, Giudizio, Mediazione (Franco Angeli Sommaggio 2012), 129-66. 
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aimed at settling controversies. This is to say that any practical 
discourse aimed at solving disputes is a distinctive form of engagement 
whose identity is defined by criteria of rationality  acting as necessary 
presuppositions lacking which practical discourse itself as a form of 
deliberation would not be possible to begin with.26  
 
The standards of practical reason implicit in dialectical exchange frame 
an ideal that can be described as discursive rationality, since those 
standards define a specific activity, namely, discourse, or deliberation.27 
Thus understood, discursive rationality is a form of communicative 
rationality: it refers to the principles underlying the discursive 
exchanges through which different views are put forward, conflicting 
claims are asserted, and disputes are settled. Discursive rationality thus 
emerges as an arrangement of principles that any practical argument 
needs to satisfy as a necessary presupposition. Among these principles, 
which govern the discursive moves in any form of communication 
aimed at subjecting some viewpoint to critical scrutiny, we should at 
least find the principles of consistency (or logical non-contradiction), 
coherence (both narrative and normative), and universalisation.28 This 
                                                            
26 For a comprehensive treatment and justification of this view, see F van Eemeren 
and R Grootendorst, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (Foris 1984) and F van 
Eemeren and R Grootendorst, ‘Rationale for a Pragma-Dialectical Perspective’(1988) 
2 Argumentation 271. This general approach is contextualised in the study of legal 
reasoning in E Feteris, ‘Conditions and Rules for Rational Discussion in a Legal 
Process: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective’ (1990) 26 Argumentation and Advocacy 
108; E Feteris, ‘Rationality of Legal Discussions: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective’ 
(1993) XV Informal Logic 179; J Plug, ‘Reconstructing Complex Argumentation in 
Judicial Decisions’ in F van Eemeren and R Grootendorst (eds), Studies in Pragma-
Dialectics (SicSat 1995), 246, and S Bertea, ‘The Arguments from Coherence’ (2005) 
25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 369. 
27 The idea of discursive rationality finds a thorough discussion in the works of Karl-
Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. See, in particular, KO Apel, ‘Das Apriori der 
Kommunikationsgemeinschaft und die Grundlagen der Ethik’ in Transformation der 
Philosophie vol. 2 (Surkhamp 1973), 358–35;  J Habermas, The Theory of 
Communicative Action, vol. 1 (McCarty 1981); J Habermas, The Theory of Communicative 
Action, vol. 2 (McCarty 1984); J Habermas, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, vol. 
8 (University of Utah Press 1988); and J Habermas, Moral Consciousness and 
Communicative Action (MIT Press 1990). The discursive approach to reasoning is 
applied to law and legal reasoning in R Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation 
(Clarendon Press 1989, or edn 1978), 177–295.  
28 A discussion of these criteria of rationality can be found in A Aarnio, R Alexy and 
A Peczenik ‘The Foundation of Legal Reasoning’ (1981) 21 Rechtstheorie 133–58, 
259–73 and 423–48; F Cavalla, ‘Della Possibilità di Fondare la Logica Giudiziaria sul 
Principio di non Contraddizione’ (1983) 12 Verifiche 5; A Aarnio, ‘Why Coherence: 
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means that legal reasoning - understood as a sequence of discursive 
moves structured around adversarial procedures - can be characterised 
as sound when it at least lacks internal contradictions, is overall 
coherent, and can be accepted by others solely on the basis of 
universalizable reasons or arguments advanced in support of its 
conclusions. So, the two basic features of sound reasoning are that its 
conclusions should not be contradictory (either with each other or with 
their premises) and that everyone who uses its principles should have 
to acknowledge those conclusions as correct.29 
 
The principles just introduced can be regarded as rational in that a 
failure to follow them makes inconceivable any debate aimed at 
resolving disputes, and in some cases makes inconceivable the very 
practice of communicating. In much the same way as discussion is 
considered a rational way to settle controversies, we should consider 
rational the criteria by which practical discourse is regulated. So, it is 
by looking at the principles of discursive rationality that we can tell 
what forms of legal reasoning are correct: no legal dispute can be said 
to have found a legitimate solution if it was settled in violation of any 
of these principles. This means that sound legal reasoning can be 
characterised as a sequence of communicative exchanges carried out in 
keeping with the principles of discursive rationality.  
 
Predictably, the principles of discursive rationality, as general and 
abstract requirements, do not conclusively determine the correct 
structures or the justified outcomes of deliberation in law: they are not 
formulas or algorithms that you apply to the premises of a dispute so as 
to self-sufficiently yield conclusions. They cannot on their own and in 
advance dictate the form, the substance, or the outcome of the 
deliberative practices carried out in accordance with them. Their role 
is structural in a rather more open-ended way, in that they only set the 
general boundaries within which legal reasoning can be characterised 
                                                                                                                                                                           
A Philosophical Point of View’ in A Peczenik (ed), On the Coherence Theory of Law 
( Jiristförlaget i Lund 1998), 33–9; R Alexy, ‘Coherence and Argumentation or the 
Genuine Twin Criterialess Super Criterion’ in A Peczenik (ed), On the Coherence 
Theory of Law ( Jiristförlaget i Lund 1998), 39–49; F Cavalla, ‘Retorica, giudiziale, 
logica e verità’ in F. Cavalla (ed) Retorica, Processo, Verità, (CEDAM 2007), 17–84; and 
P Sommaggio, Contraddittorio, Giudizio, Mediazione (Franco Angeli Sommaggio 2012), 
180–204. 
29 On this point see, in particular, F Cavalla, La Prospettiva Processuale del Diritto 
(CEDAM 1991), 68–83. 
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as sound. It follows that the principles of discursive rationality do not 
exhaust and replace actual debate in a courtroom proceeding;  rather 
they set out the minimal conditions for a discussion to exist, and in so 
doing provide the method that needs be followed in order to embark 
on rational discussion. Hence, the normative framework so constructed 
- the framework outside which no discussion can take place - is 
context-dependent not only by virtue of its being compatible with any 
number of outcomes, but also in the more poignant sense that, in 
order to make it operative, the discussants need to bring into it the 
substantive presuppositions, or shared knowledge, forming the 
necessary background of the claims they make. These are what 
Aristotle called endoxa, the ‘commonplaces’ that make up our ‘shared 
knowledge’ or widely accepted beliefs. Endoxa act as general premises 
on which  the (non-private) validity of the claims asserted by the 
discussants rests. Clearly, the endoxa one brings into the discussion are 
specific to the issue at hand, and so each rational discussion will have 
its own endoxa (and no genuine discussion can go without endoxa, 
either). The rationale of the appeal to endoxa can be thus summarised: 
endoxa can support the specific arguments that unfold in dialectical 
exchanges because they embody what deserves to be acknowledged 
once the social context in which a specific discussion is undertaken is 
taken due account.  
 
To conclude, on the dialectical model introduced in this section, legal 
reasoning must satisfy the principles of discursive rationality, if it is to 
constitute a sound method for dealing with legal disputes. So, as much 
as the adversarial procedure framing the discursive exchanges made in 
courtroom proceedings is an essential part of the reasoning involved in 
legal adjudication, it does not, on a fully articulated dialectical 
approach, complete the picture of sound legal reasoning. For sound 
legal reasoning is more than a structured sequence of discursive 
exchanges, insofar as the latter need to be understood as part of an 
argumentative practice informed by the principles of discursive 
rationality.30 
                                                            
30 The fundamental tenets shaping the framework we theorise differentiate it from 
two influential theoretical approaches to legal reasoning that may arguably be 
interpreted as defending claims conceptually akin to those we theorise in this work, 
namely, the hermeneutical account of legal argument and the view of legal 
reasoning associated with Martin Shapiro’s ‘political jurisprudence’. The affinity 
between the theory we defend, the conception theorised by the champions of legal 
hermeneutics and the account advocated by Shapiro is due to the fact that they all 
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deny the existence of a neat distinction between law and legal reasoning, on the one 
hand, and politics and practical decision-making on the other hand. In addition, 
they all pay specific attention to the processes of communication going on between 
the subjects who take part in the activities of legal deliberation. Finally, all three 
accounts agree, at least to some extent, that the use of foreign precedents is best 
understood as a way of coordinating and harmonising practices of adjudication that 
are carried out by units (namely, courts of different legal systems) inhabiting a space 
that is not informed by hierarchical structures (this point is formulated most clearly 
in M Shapiro and A Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics, and Judicialization (OUP 2002), 
90-101). In that respect, the three accounts may be argued to at least superficially 
converge on the view that the practice of appealing to foreign precedents ultimately 
constitutes a form of ‘unhierarchically coordinated judge-made law’ and that in the 
areas covered by that practice courts seek to achieve coordination through 
‘horizontal interstate stare decisis’ and so they adopt a ‘mode of non-authoritative 
legal communication’ (M Shapiro and A Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics, and 
Judicialization (OUP 2002), 95). These elements set the three theoretical approaches 
apart from most of the other theories of legal reasoning supported nowadays. 
Despite this conceptual continuity, however, the account we offer can neither be 
reduced to legal hermeneutics nor be equated to Shapiro’s theory of legal reasoning. 
The project undertaken by legal hermeneutics is best interpreted as aimed to 
provide a heuristic device for an adequate understanding of the forms of legal 
deliberation. As a result, the hermeneutical approach grants one invaluable insights 
on the actual pre-conceptions and specific pre-understanding affecting the 
interpretive processes framing legal adjudication. Related, it makes one acutely 
aware of the nature of those processes as well as their discretionary quality. Yet, 
contrary to the theory introduced in this section, legal hermeneutics is not directly 
concerned with the normative dimension of adjudication and so is unable to 
establish any normative standard for legal reasoning (for further remarks on the 
shortcomings of legal hermeneutics see F Zanuso, ‘In Claris non Fit Interpretatio: 
las Ilusiones del Normativismo en la Critica del la Hermenéutica’ in Aa.Vv., 
Hermenéutica Juridica: Sobre el Alcance de la Interpretaciòn en le Derecho (Comillas 2011), 
255-75). The normative dimension is largely absent from Shapiro’s proposal too. His 
political jurisprudence is programmatically meant to apply the principles of social 
sciences to the study of law (cf. M Shapiro and A Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics, and 
Judicialization (OUP 2002), 3-18). As a result, Shapiro’s political jurisprudence is less 
a normatively oriented full-scale legal philosophy than a sophisticated and insightful 
contribution to behavioural social science that can be comfortably situated within 
the American realist movement (broadly understood) and related pragmatic turn in 
jurisprudence (paradigmatic in that respect is the treatment of the doctrine of 
precedent that can be found in M Shapiro and A Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics, and 
Judicialization (OUP 2002), 102-11). On this basis, political jurisprudence present 
courts and judges as ‘part of government’, which as such ‘must be studied 
empirically’ (M Shapiro and A Stone Sweet, On Law, Politics, and Judicialization 
(OUP 2002), 13). This feature neatly distinguishes Shapiro’s peculiarly empirical 
approach to precedents in law from the account of precedents introduced in this 
paper, which, by contrast, is essentially characterised by the explicit endorsement of 
the normative standpoint - namely, the standpoint that is mostly absent in both 
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 Dialectic and Reasoning with Foreign Precedent 2.
It was just remarked that the dialectical model of legal reasoning 
introduced in the previous section defines an argumentative practice 
necessarily informed by the principles of discursive rationality. It 
follows from that feature of the model that foreign precedents are 
presumed to have some kind of bearing on the cases at hand. Foreign 
precedents are here understood to comprise both the argument offered 
in support of a judicial decision and its substantive outcome. There is 
an intrinsic rationality to the practice of relying on past arguments and 
decisions in dealing with present issues. The intrinsic rationality of the 
practice is owed to the fact that precedents - including foreign ones - 
result from past legal proceedings. Insofar as they are carried out in 
accordance with adversarial procedures enabling prosecutor and 
parties to engage in argumentative activities where the parties defend 
their own claims before the judge and argue against those put forward 
by the counterparty, legal proceedings have an inherent value. The 
inherent value of practices so framed lies in their being structured in a 
rational way rather than simply occurring as a series of events involving 
certain individuals and taking place in a certain place at a certain time 
and under certain conditions. Legal proceedings, in other words, do 
not exist as mere facts, but concretise the general and abstract 
principles of discursive rationality. It is for this reason - namely, 
because courtroom proceedings make it possible to decide disputes in 
a rational way - that the arguments and rulings contained in precedents 
are prima facie justified. They are justified, in other terms, by virtue of 
the presumptively rational manner in which they have dealt with a 
dispute in the past.  Since, in the context of a legal proceeding, the 
judge, the prosecutor, and the parties learn a great deal by engaging 
with disputes decided beforehand in accordance with rational 
procedures, a foreign precedent can legitimately extend its effect to 
subsequent domestic cases so long as it can be found to have been 
correctly decided.  
 
These introductory remarks show that, on a dialectical account 
informed by the principles of discursive rationality, foreign precedents 
are endowed with presumptive binding force. We call their binding 
force presumptive because it is ultimately conditioned upon the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
legal hermeneutics and Shapiro’s view. Hence the distinctiveness of the approach 
we set out to defend in this work when compared to the approaches to legal 
reasoning that show some continuity with our research programme.         
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rational acceptability of both the previous deliberative activities carried 
out in the courtroom and their outcomes. It follows from that that the 
authority of a foreign precedent ultimately rests on how convincing the 
courts should find its argument and ruling. This admittedly blunt 
statement of the dialectical position that we endorse needs to be 
refined and qualified. On the one hand, the statement should not be 
taken to mean that the provenance of the precedent - foreign, as 
opposed to domestic - is completely irrelevant. On the other hand, it 
starts out from an idea of legal authority that can be seen to be 
instantiated by precedents. Both of these points call for further 
elaboration.  
 
Let us take them up in turn and consider first the main issues relating 
to the provenance of a precedent. From a dialectical perspective shaped 
by the standards of discursive rationality, the bindingness of a 
precedent - be it domestic or foreign - is constructed in the process of 
carrying out a courtroom proceeding, where a prosecutor and the 
parties exchange arguments under a judge’s control and supervision. 
This principle is general and so applies to domestic and foreign 
precedents alike. However, the argumentative burden one carries in 
resorting to these two types of precedent is not the same. As part of the 
same legal system where the present controversy has arisen, a domestic 
precedent can be presumed to apply to that controversy, provided that 
it can be argued to apply to a situation relevantly similar to the case 
presently before the court. A domestic precedent can accordingly be 
assumed to authoritatively apply to the present dispute, unless its 
relevance is challenged by one of the parties involved in the dispute.  
 
The process by which to validate recourse to foreign precedents is, by 
contrast, more thorough and detailed. Foreign precedents cannot 
enjoy the same presumption that domestic ones do  concerning their 
relevance and applicability. There is therefore an additional 
argumentative burden, peculiar and more demanding, that comes with 
the use of foreign precedents. This burden mainly consists in the 
requirement that an argument be produced showing that the foreign 
precedent at issue does not come from institutional contexts informed 
by legal traditions, principles, and norms incompatible with the ones 
shaping the legal system in which the present case is being decided. 
This means that, before foreign precedents can be used in adjudication, 
they need to be carefully introduced and systematically discussed in 
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the courtroom. Such extensive debate offers the prosecutor, the parties, 
and the judge an opportunity to assess the soundness of a foreign 
precedent in the context of the present dispute so as to make sure that 
the precedent is relevant and that, despite its foreign provenance, it 
cannot be regarded as completely alien to the legal framework in 
relation to which it is being considered as authoritative. Conversely, 
any appeal to foreign precedents should be regarded as arbitrary and 
unjustified if the precedents used in the judicial justification of a 
ruling have not been specifically debated in the courtroom. 
 
It emerges from the foregoing remarks that the dialectical approach we 
are defending, for one thing, locates our present engagement with 
precedents front and centre, and for another it makes the binding 
force of a foreign precedent by and large conditional on that 
precedent’s substantive justification in the eyes of the prosecutor, the 
parties, and the judge in the current legal proceeding. To many, the 
latter conclusion flies in the face of the classic doctrine of precedent, 
which attaches formal, vis-à-vis substantive, authority to precedents in 
law. As a result, the dialectical approach may be interpreted as 
effectively denying the authoritative force of foreign precedents. 
However, this interpretation can only be defended if legal authority is 
conceived in accordance with what can be termed the ‘deferential 
model’ of authority - a model irreconcilable with the fundamental idea 
behind the dialectical approach. From a dialectical point of view, no 
authority can conclusively command deference, since all legitimate 
authority ultimately owes its binding force and directive power to the 
rationality of discursive processes. Therefore, in a framework based on 
dialectic, the authority associated with precedent in law can only be 
characterised as ‘dialogic’ authority, in contrast to deferential authority. 
Let us further expand on this point, which is fraught with theoretical 
implications.  
 
An authority can be characterised as deferential insofar as it issues 
content-independent directives providing exclusionary reasons for 
action.31 On this conception, an authoritative statement is considered 
                                                            
31 This notion of authority is paradigmatically argued for in J Raz, The Authority of 
Law: Essays on Law and Morality (OUP 1979), 3–33; J Raz, The Morality of Freedom 
(OUP 1986), 23–105; J Raz, ‘Facing Up: A Reply’ (1989) 62 Southern California Law 
Review 1153–1235, 1179–1200; J Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Hutchinson 1990), 49–
84; J Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics 
(Clarendon Press 1994), 194–221, and J Raz, ‘The Problem of Authority: Revisiting 
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binding, not by virtue of the soundness of its substantive rationale, but 
simply in virtue of its having been issued by a competent institution at 
some point in the past. When considered authoritative in this 
deferential sense, past decisions are claimed to affect later disputes 
even if those decisions turn out to be substantively incorrect or 
mistaken. Precedents so construed can thus be qualified as ‘opaque’ to 
their own rationale: their binding force is independent of their 
underlying justification. Now, that is the traditional doctrine of 
precedent, implied in which it is, then, a deferential notion of 
authority. To state it otherwise, precedents in law are traditionally 
found to be authoritative in the deferential sense just discussed.  
 
This is not so from a dialectical perspective, which outright rejects the 
notion of deferential authority. In fact, the deferential model of 
authority is grounded in theoretical presuppositions that cannot be 
made compatible with the fundamental principles of discursive 
rationality. Deferential authority can be said to follow an exclusionary 
logic, for it instructs one to behave in a certain way and to disregard 
certain substantive reasons for acting otherwise. This exclusionary 
logic makes it so that, in the words of Joseph Raz, the statements 
issuing from an authority enjoy "a relative independence from the 
reasons which justify them" and can be regarded as "complete reasons 
in their own right".32 Quite the opposite is true of discursive rationality, 
which proceeds from an ideal of communicative exchange operating on 
a principle of openness to criticism. Discursive rationality gives 
expression to the idea of a dialogue, or discursive exchange, between 
parties making different claims. It thus frames and legitimises 
discussions in which each party is allowed to introduce any claim or 
argument whatsoever (so long as it is pertinent) and to rebut any claim 
or argument made by the counterparty.33 On this approach, then, every 
claim will be assessed on its own merits. Here we have an ideal of 
rationality where nothing escapes the reach of critical scrutiny, and so 
everything may be brought into the discussion and then also 
challenged. This means that from a dialectical perspective shaped by 
the principles of dialectical rationality, (legitimate) authority is not 
based on deference, since on the dialectical model certain questions 
                                                                                                                                                                           
the Service Conception’ (2005) 90 Minnesota Law Review 1003. 
32 J Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Hutchinson 1990), 79. 
33 This point is argued at length in R Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation 
(Clarendon Press 1989, or edn 1978), 187-197. 
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are not barred from consideration for the sole fact that a competent 
institution has decided that there should not be any further 
deliberation on a given rule, and so the rule is protected from 
additional scrutiny. On a dialectical approach, by contrast, authority is 
grounded in dialogue, understood as a form of communication where 
any claim needs to be subjected to collective scrutiny before it 
becomes the basis for a decision.34 So, on a dialectical theory, the kind 
of authority precedents can aspire to is not deferential, but dialogic.  
 
Dialogic authority can be defined in the sense expounded in Cunliffe’s 
and Reeve’s seminal work as a kind of authority that only commands 
temporary power-delegation and conditional submission. 35  What it 
means for one to be under an authority in the dialogic sense under 
                                                            
34 The idea of discursive rationality, we submit, is best accounted by relying on the 
metaphor of a dialogue between parties making conflicting claims. This statement is 
justified by the fact that in our framework of thought discursive rationality refers to 
a set of standards emerging from the structure of exchanges between individuals 
who mutually recognise the counterparty as a partner having equal rights and 
dignity in a joint enterprise (practical deliberation). Related, one only complies with 
the requirements constitutive of discursive rationality insofar as, when putting 
forward her claims, she does not seek to impose her views on the counterparties or 
to merely persuade them, but rather she is concerned with convincing the 
counterparties of the soundness, or normative correctness, of her position. 
Accordingly, the notion of discursive rationality can hardly be described in terms of 
kinds of interpersonal conversations that follow a non-dialogic structure, such as, 
for instance, negotiations going on between parties bearing conflicting interests. 
For, whilst those concerned play an essential role in the proceedings governed by 
the standards of discursive rationality, in the theoretical model we are defending, 
controversies cannot be settled in any way the parties may like, or regard it to be in 
their own interest, as it is instead the case with negotiation-like processes. By 
contrast, the conduct of the parties involved in an exchange informed by the 
standards of discursive rationality is controlled by a set of principles that put 
constraints on the options available to those parties. Hence, discursive rationality 
shapes practical reasoning as an activity regulated by norms that are not settled by, 
or negotiated between, the concerned parties and so largely pre-exist the actual 
interactions between those parties. This dimension sets the processes governed by 
the principles of discursive rationality apart from the standard forms of bargaining 
and negotiation, which the parties are free to model as they go along on the basis of 
their own preferences. The metaphor of dialogue we rely on, in sum, is meant to 
emphasise the fact that discursive rationality is not reducible to the merely 
prudential kind of practical reason governing negotiation-like enterprises, or 
bargaining-like activities, which are ultimately intended to merely match the actual 
objectives and needs of the concerned parties.     
35 J Cunliffe and A Reeve, ‘Dialogic Authority’ (1999) 19 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 453. 
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consideration is to be under certain practical constraints. Those 
subject to dialogic authority are not free to act on the basis of their best 
judgment about the case at hand: they understand that they may very 
well have to accept a course of conduct contrary to that judgment. 
However, this submission to dialogic authority does mean that one has 
to unconditionally suspend her capacity for practical judgment and 
independent action. Those subject to authority are rather dealing with 
a momentary and partial delegation of our practical prerogatives. By 
acknowledging an institution or practice as a dialogic authority, one 
accepts to defer to it in practical matters of public policy, while 
retaining the right to question those in authority if they should issue 
directives that may be argued to depart too much from what is 
substantively correct in accordance with the principles of dialectical 
rationality.36 So, dialogic authority is such that those in authority are 
empowered to govern, but on the understanding that that power can 
be revoked at any time. This means that, on the one hand, those in 
authority are always accountable for the rules they issue, but at the 
same time those subject to authority retain their independence even in 
those areas where they have delegated their power to act on their own 
best judgment, since that delegation is temporary and revocable, 
having been granted subject to a condition of accountability.  
 
So, the claim that precedents are authoritative in a dialogic sense, 
rather than in a deferential one, means that while precedents do have a 
binding force, that force is neither absolute nor content-independent. 
Recourse to a precedent is justified only insofar as the conclusion it 
reaches and the reasons offered in support of that conclusion are 
found to be compelling by those who subsequently participate in 
settling legal disputes involving relevantly similar cases. Failing this 
condition, precedents cannot be legitimately used in legal adjudication, 
and so cannot be said to have a binding force.  
 
It bears pointing out here that, on a dialectical approach, authoritative 
precedents come not with just any sort of reason, but with reinforced 
reasons that carry extra weight in supporting a judicial decision. Unlike 
an ordinary, or not reinforced, reason, which can only be judged on its 
                                                            
36 As it is put in J Cunliffe and A Reeve, ‘Dialogic Authority’ (1999) 19 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 453, 462, ‘a movement from deferential authority to dialogic 
authority occurs when the authority-subject begins to insist on some elaboration of 
the reasons underlying the requirements or judgements of authority’. 
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own merits, a reinforced reason gains justificatory force, on top of that 
inherent soundness, by virtue of its source. In other terms, if a reason 
or argument was put forward by an authoritative institution in keeping 
with an established method of reasoning, it will enjoy a prima facie 
plausibility, or presumption of correctness, that other reasons (those 
not so issued) cannot claim for themselves. However, the point here is 
that reinforced reasons, and the precedents in which they are 
contained, can be understood in two different ways depending on the 
view of authority in light of which they are considered.  
 
From the standpoint of authority in a deferential sense, reinforced 
reasons are exclusionary (they bar competing reasons regardless of how 
compelling they may be); from the standpoint of authority of in a 
dialogic sense, their reinforced status does not rule out a priori the 
ability to invoke other substantive reasons. So, on a dialectical 
approach, as much as precedents may trump other reasons in light of 
which the case at hand could be decided, this ‘reinforced’ priority is 
not so entrenched as to exclude those other reasons altogether: these 
will always live in the background, from which they can always be 
pulled out, reintroduced, and brought to bear on the case at hand. 
That is because, as we have been discussing, precedents owe their 
binding force not just to their source (to the fact of their having been 
issued by a competent authority) but also, and importantly, to their 
underlying justification, and precedents that no longer reflect this 
second component - by virtue of their ruling out all justificatory 
reasons other than the ones adduced in the precedent itself, thereby 
forestalling any further reasoning - cannot be said to be binding. 
 
In sum, on a dialectical approach, precedents and the justificatory 
reasons adduced in their support are distinct, but ultimately connected: 
although they form distinct classes, the separation is only temporary 
and limited, not absolute. This is so because, on this view, an 
authoritative precedent differs from a substantive justification by 
reason of its force. An authoritative precedent bears on the outcome of 
judicial deliberation not by barring substantive reasoning, but by 
competing with other practical reasons from a position of advantage 
(by virtue of its having a pedigree, or being ‘reinforced’). Reasoning 
with precedent therefore involves a systematic bias: the reinforced 
reasons attached to precedents will generally outweigh, by virtue of 
their source, any other reasons that would otherwise apply. As a result, 
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a precedent will as a matter of fact prevail on conflicting substantive 
reasons most of the time, though not always. For there may well be 
cases in which the additional strength built into an authoritative 
precedent will not enable it to trump or outweigh conflicting 
substantive reasons. In these cases it will be legitimate for courts to 
depart from precedent. Such a departure is possible only under special 
circumstances, however, meaning that it is a really strong argument 
that one will have to present in order to rebut a precedent.37 This 
means that when a court is confronted with a precedent, it is 
presumptively bound to follow it. However, this obligation is neither 
absolute nor ultimately content-independent, since it can be disobeyed 
when concurrent reasons supporting an alternative decision turn out, 
upon scrutiny, to be stronger than those sourced to a precedent. So, 
although precedents come with a stronger justificatory force, that force 
is nonetheless defeasible.38 
 
Now, the reader may have noticed that in our account of the authority 
of precedents we have not distinguished domestic and foreign 
precedents. That is because, from a dialectical perspective, both kinds 
of precedents should be understood as authoritative statements in the 
dialogic sense. This position follows from the more general claim that 
we should do away with any rigid separation between what is inside a 
system of law and what is outside. From a dialectical perspective, legal 
systems can hardly be conceived as standalone or rigorously separated 
orders: the separation between different legal systems is at best partial 
and relative. Indeed, on a dialectical approach, law is conceived as a 
global phenomenon, an interconnected web of principles, policies, and 
provisions that may well have its boundaries, making for 
discontinuities and local differences, but not to such an extent as to 
result in a set of isolated units without any communication between 
them. Law so conceived is only contingently connected to its territory, 
since the legal domain is a common space inhabited by courts and 
litigants from different regions and traditions. 
                                                            
37 On the defeasibility of authoritative directives, and the exceptional circumstances 
in which they may fail to exert their authority, see W Waluchow, ‘Authority and the 
Practical Difference Thesis: A Defence of Inclusive Legal Positivism’ (2000) 6 Legal 
Theory 45. 
38 These points are expanded in S Perry, ‘Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the 
Common Law’ (1987) 7 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 215 and S Perry, ‘Second-
Order Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal Theory’ (1989) 62 Southern California Law 
Review 913. 




This should not be taken to mean that local history, tradition, and 
culture have no role in shaping the law. Quite the contrary: it is a 
significant role that they play in that regard. But it is also true, as a 
matter of practice, that the line between national law and international 
law is constantly being blurred in adjudication. In light of that 
background, the idea that national legal systems are self-contained and 
mutually impenetrable spheres - an idea typically associated with the 
dominant view - turns out to be no more than an ideological claim 
sitting poorly with current practices in legal adjudication. Indeed, that 
idea fails to appreciate the interconnectedness of law in a world where 
economic, social, and political interactions cross national borders, and 
the fact that legal adjudication must adapt, for it is increasingly dealing 
with legal disputes which often reflect that reality, involving parties 
operating in a transnational context. So, just as the socioeconomic 
system is internationalising, so should legal deliberation and decision-
making. In fact, this is precisely the trend, considering that 
adjudication is increasingly being shaped by principles shared on a 
global level.  
 
The dialectical approach to reasoning with precedent must accordingly 
be understood as conceptually linked to an internationalist legal 
perspective. From such a perspective, the use of foreign precedents in 
domestic adjudication is seen as an example of the increasing 
internationalisation of law and as a paradigmatic way in which a legal 
system can affirm its membership in the international community 
through processes of adjudication. Accordingly, the rigorous 
distinction between domestic and foreign precedents can be argued to 
be artificial - grounded in ideology rather than in theory. In this 
context, a precedent should be conceived as a legal resource capable of 
shedding light on disputes beyond the domestic sphere. From the 
dialectical point of view, thus, when an issue debated in one 
jurisdiction crops up in another, those engaged in settling the more 
recent dispute should not be barred from borrowing legal arguments 
previously devised elsewhere. Because legal systems around the world 
often face similar problems, comparing and testing solutions found 
abroad is not only legitimate, but also rational. After all, past decisions 
may well make it possible to see the present controversy from a 
different angle and turn it into a tractable affair. With the ability to rely 
on precedents regardless of where they have been set, a constitutional 
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court or an international tribunal can broaden its perspective by 
including new ideas, viewpoints, and opinions into the current legal 
proceeding. Since useful insights can be garnered from other legal 
systems, a system of law stands to lose by clinging to a practice of 
foreclosing possible avenues of deliberation, excluding potentially 
sound modes of reasoning and decision-making just because they are 
not the product of domestic judicial practices.  
 
In the same spirit, it is essential, from a dialectical perspective, that 
foreign precedents should not merely be cited as window-dressing. In 
order for foreign precedents to be able to serve as valuable lessons in 
domestic adjudication, they need to be thoroughly discussed in the 
legal proceedings in the jurisdiction for which they are being 
considered as possible solutions: the legal experience developed 
elsewhere needs to be genuinely engaged with by the prosecutor, the 
parties, and the judge in their effort to find the best solution to the 
case at bar, for otherwise recourse to foreign precedent would turn 
into a mere academic exercise, which is not how legal reasoning and 
reasoning with precedent are conceived on the dialectical approach. In 
accordance to the latter, legal argumentation is conceived not as a 
monological enterprise, but as a form of collective deliberation; it is 
not something that can be achieved by a lone agent - typically the 
judge - on an isolated, almost heroic quest for the normatively correct 
settlement of any legal dispute.39 Even assuming that judges do have 
such skills, and even considering that they have the last word in the 
settlement of a legal dispute, its outcome will not have the backing of a 
full justification unless the claims made by the parties are debated in 
the context of an adversarial procedure that contributes to shaping the 
final judicial decision through a process of discursive exchange. Judges, 
in other words, should not be able to ignore the claims, reasons, 
arguments, interpretations, and narratives that prosecutor and parties 
introduce in the courtroom in making their case: in order for a judicial 
opinion to be legitimate, it must take into account the full spectrum of 
possibilities laid out by prosecutor and parties through a procedure 
that makes it possible for them to hear and challenge each other’s 
                                                            
39 The reference here is to Dworkin’s law-as-integrity theory, which conceives legal 
adjudication as a practice shaped by Hercules, a mythical figure of judge entrusted 
with the solitary task of reconstructing the entire legal system as a coherent whole 
in deciding any dispute. This view is introduced in R Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously (Duckworth 1977) and fully developed in R Dworkin, Law’s Empire 
(Fontana 1986).  





In conclusion, on a dialectical approach, which views reasoning in law 
as a structurally open process that can legitimately bring outside 
sources of adjudication into the legal proceeding, adversarial 
procedures and discussion are central to the process of legal reasoning. 
The only condition is that those sources come into the legal 
proceeding through a process of discussion. For it defeats the purpose 
of adjudication to introduce reasons and decisions into it uncritically, 
without the benefit of adversarial scrutiny through the participation of 
prosecutor and parties.  
 
 CONCLUSION  V.
 
In this paper, we have set out to offer a qualified justification for a 
practice that has become widespread among courts in several 
jurisdictions across the world: that of settling domestic disputes by 
recourse to foreign precedents. To this end we blocked out a 
dialectical theory of legal reasoning as an activity structured by 
communicative exchanges between the parties in a courtroom and 
governed by general principles of discursive rationality. Legal 
reasoning, we argued, can thus be understood as an open-ended 
dialectical enterprise defined by two components, one of which is 
structural (the adversarial procedure) and the other substantive (the 
principles of rationality). What makes it open-ended is both the 
structure (that of a debate) and the substantive principles, since these 
are solid enough that they cannot be dismissed, so they have a role in 
shaping the discussion, and yet they are not so specific that they can 
fully determine its outcome. The gist of the argument, thus, was that 
this view of legal reasoning adequately captures the nature of authority 
in law and that of recourse to precedents (including foreign ones) in 
legal adjudication.  
 
The theory we defended recognises both the context-sensitive nature 
of legal reasoning and its discursively rational character. On the one 
hand, we claimed that from a dialectical perspective, no deliberative 
activity carried out in legal proceedings is fully legitimate unless it is 
grounded in adversarial structures enabling all the parties affected by 
                                                            
40  This point is discussed at length in P Sommaggio, Contraddittorio, Giudizio, 
Mediazione (Franco Angeli 2012), 139–42. 
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the judicial decision to discuss and scrutinise the arguments and 
narratives offered by the counterparties. This is a process through 
which not only the outcome, but also the structure of legal reasoning 
in adjudication cannot be predetermined. That is, a decisive factor in 
determining the structure and outcome of legal reasoning is given by 
the behaviour of the prosecutor, the parties, and the judge as they 
engage in debating competing reconstructions of the dispute and the 
applicable law. On the other hand, we argued that this particularistic 
element, inherent in the very idea of dialectic, is combined with 
another element, which is that all sound reasoning is governed by a 
number of general and abstract principles of discursive rationality. 
These principles act as regulative ideals internal to, and constitutive of, 
the very practice of arguing and discussing. They are, in other words, 
an essential condition of the possibility of legal reasoning. Importantly, 
this claim also is supported by our view of legal reasoning as a 
dialectical activity. Indeed, we noted that a dialectical approach to 
reasoning in law requires a prosecutor, the parties, and a judge to set 
up exchanges in such a way as to enable them to work through some 
dispute or disagreement. To this end they each need to be able to 
proffer, assess, and challenge a range of reasons and arguments that 
can be adduced in support of the claims they or the other side is 
making. This practice - that of deliberation, argument, and 
counterargument - rests on constitutive principles of its own that 
define the fundamental presuppositions failing which the practice 
would not be possible to begin with (if it is to come out as a 
deliberative practice rather than a conversational one in a broader 
sense). At least three such principles of discursive rationality can be 
named - those of non-contradiction, coherence, and universalisation - 
and they are recognised as universally binding insofar as they are 
necessary, for, clearly, you cannot have a proper discussion with 
someone, or come to an agreement with them, if they insist on making 
contradictory claims and offering reasons which only they can accept 
or which only suit their own interests. A discussant may make a 
strategically successful move, but if the claims and arguments put 
forward in making that move turn out to be inconsistent or incoherent, 
or if they cannot be universalised, then the move places the discussant 
outside the argumentative realm, that of genuine reasoning. This 
means that no one who ignores the principles of consistency, 
coherence, and universalisation can have access to the realm of 
argumentation. The principles of discursive rationality should in this 
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sense be considered necessary standards: they are valid independently 
of whether those engaged in argumentation explicitly recognise them, 
and so they act as preconditions for anyone wishing to argue 
intelligibly with anyone else. 
 
